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Articles Posted in Stockbroker Misconduct

In July 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a lifetime ban upon Carl Birkelbach, the founder and principal of Birkelbach Investment Securities (headquartered in Chicago, Illinois), which prevents him from participating in any working capacity in the securities industry.  Mr. Birkelbach appealed the SEC’s ban, claiming in part that the SEC exceeded its authority in imposing such a severe penalty upon him.  Earlier this month, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago denied his appeal and upheld the SEC ban, stating that Mr. Birkelbach’s offenses were sufficiently egregious to warrant the sanction imposed by the SEC.

As the head of Birkelbach Investment Securities, Mr. Birkelbach was required to supervise the trading activities of the company’s registered representatives, including William Murphy.  According to the SEC, Mr. Murphy engaged for years in unauthorized conduct, steering clients into unsuitable investments, and churning in client accounts — all of which Mr. Birkelbach was purportedly aware of.  Despite Mr. Birkelbach’s alleged knowledge of the wrongdoing taking place at his company, he imposed no discipline upon Mr. Murphy, never disapproved of a single trade by Murphy, and never contacted the most egregiously harmed customer to discuss the high volume of trading in the customer’s account.  During the years in question, the revenues from Mr. Murphy’s trading in that account, according to SEC calculations, represented nearly 20% of Birkelbach Investment Securities’ total revenue.  Even when the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) requested that Mr. Birkelbach place Mr. Murphy on heightened supervision, Mr. Birkelbach failed to comply.  As a result, FINRA imposed upon Mr. Birkelbach a punishment that ultimately became a lifetime ban from the securities industry in any capacity, which the SEC subsequently affirmed in its July 2013 ruling.

If you have questions about your legal rights, or have been the victim of investment fraud, please contact Scott Silver of the Silver Law Group for a free consultation at ssilver@silverlaw.com or Toll Free at (800) 975-4345.

If the Connecticut Department of Banking (the “Department”) has its way, Meyers Associates and its owner, Bruce Meyers, will be barred from selling securities in Connecticut. A February 2014 Order to Cease and Desist issued by the Department, charges Meyers Associates and Bruce Meyers (“Respondents”) with numerous violations of Connecticut securities laws.  The Order states the Department’s intent to fine Respondents and revoke their registration to sell securities in Connecticut.

The present charges against Respondents stem from a 2012 examination by the Department, out of which the Department claims to have discovered multiple violations of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act and FINRA rules.  Notably, the Department alleges that Respondents failed to properly supervise employees with known disciplinary histories, violated an order from the Vermont securities regulator, and failed to completely respond to both the Department’s and FINRA’s requests for information and documents.

In seeking fines and revocation of Respondents’ licenses, the Department cites to Meyers Associates’ history of run-ins with the Department over allegations that it employed unregistered agents, offered and sold unregistered securities, engaged in fraud in connection with the sale of securities, engaged in dishonest and unethical practices, violated FINRA conduct rules, and failed to enforce and maintain adequate supervisory procedures.  FINRA’s BrokerCheck report for Meyers Associates shows 14 final regulatory events, two pending regulatory events, and nine final arbitrations.

Of all the guarantees, bells and whistles associated with variable annuities, perhaps the biggest guarantee is the steep up-front commission the financial advisor can earn for selling the product.

According to a recent Reuters’ article, variable annuity sales in the U.S. totaled $142.8 billion last year, and brokers can earn 7 percent or more in commissions on the insurance products.  Based on simple arithmetic, the commissions earned on an annual basis exceeds a billion dollars.

However, investors may be damaged when these complex products are not properly explained, tax or liquidity factors are not considered, or the advisor engages in “twisting” of improper annuity switching.  “Twisting” happens when a broker encourages a client to trade in an older annuity to buy a different one, often at significant cost to the client and benefit to the broker.

UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico has come under the scrutiny of a leading bond market commentator, The Bond Buyer in yesterday’s article titled, UBS Puerto Rico Faces Surge in Arbitration Claims.  Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch’s credit ratings agencies downgraded Puerto Rico’s general obligation bonds to junk bond status, which is below the investment grade status given to most U.S. municipal bonds.  The downgrade was predicted by UBS Financial Services’ (UBS) recent report Municipal Brief: Puerto Rico Credit & Market Update dated January 29, 2104.  This prediction came long after UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico branch offices mobilized its sales force with a targeted marketing campaign to sell the UBS Puerto Rico Family of Funds to investors.  A market revelation that is too late for those Puerto Rico investors’ whose portfolios are now heavily laden with UBS’ proprietary closed-end funds geographically concentrated in Puerto Rico bonds.

As mentioned in our previous blog post, “The removal of Puerto Rico municipal bonds from the universe of ‘investment grade’ municipal bonds could potentially result in increased sell orders from municipal bond portfolio managers driving prices lower.”  Further price declines in Puerto Rico municipal bonds has already occurred and the effects for many UBS closed-end funds, including UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, has been an average drop in many of the funds’ net asset values (NAV) of another 5% since the announced credit ratings downgrades.

Scott L. Silver, managing partner of Silver Law Group, has brought clarity to many Puerto Rico investors who have contacted his law firm.  These investors have a better understanding of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) securities arbitration process.  The bond buyer reported, “his firm has filed about three dozen claims for FINRA arbitration in the past several weeks.”  According to the Bond Buyer interview Mr. Silver pointed out that FINRA “rules require dealers to supervise the activities in customer accounts” and said “his clients’ losses may be attributed to a failure by UBS to supervise their financial advisors.”

The Stifel Nicolaus & Company story about financial advisors’ lack of training and supervision concerning exchange traded funds (ETFs) is not much different than other Wall Street giants, including Morgan Stanley, UBS, Citigroup and Wells Fargo who were fined for similar violations.  On December 17, 2013 Stifel Nicolaus & Company agreed to a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (AWC) with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and fined $1 million for violation of FINRA rules related to the sale of non-traditional ETFs to retail investors.  FINRA determined in the AWC violations related to a failure to supervise the unsuitable investment advice provided by its financial advisors to retail investors.

Non-traditional exchange traded funds are investments designed to achieve investment returns that are a multiple (leveraged) of an underlying benchmark or the inverse (negative correlation) to an underlying benchmark.  The leveraged or inverse ETFs are designed to track an underlying basket of securities, indexes, currencies or commodities.  In order to achieve these investment results derivatives, swaps and futures contracts must be used which makes non-traditional ETFs complex investments rarely understood by the financial advisors who recommend them.

Non-traditional ETFs use derivatives, swaps and futures contracts to accomplish the intended performance objectives and requires a daily reset of the portfolio holdings which results in a tracking error over time.  In other words, most non-traditional ETFs are only managed to meet the investment objectives on a daily basis.   Due to the tracking errors over time and the effects of leverage, the performance of an ETF can differ greatly from the performance of the underlying basket of securities, indexes, currencies or commodities.  According to a FINRA regulatory notice, “While the customer-specific suitability analysis depends on the investor’s particular circumstances, inverse and leveraged ETFs typically are not suitable for retail investors who plan to hold them for more than one trading session, particularly in volatile markets.”  For buy-and-hold investors, non-traditional exchange traded fund investments have experienced investment results much different from the projections made by their financial advisors.

UBS Financial Services of Puerto (UBS )recently reported the net asset values (NAV) for their proprietary closed-end funds mat suffer future losses.  These funds are a part of the UBS Puerto Rico Family of Funds which are marketed exclusively to Puerto Rico residents.  The UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, are leveraged 50% and concentrated in Puerto Rico issuers, continue to suffer losses with many Puerto Rico issuer credit ratings coming under review for potential downgrades.  As of January 2, 2014, UBS reported the UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds have declined on average another 7.15% and 4.16%, over the last 22 days.

According to UBS Financial Services,  Puerto Rico Municipal Bonds are currently under review for a downgrade in credit quality by Moody’s Rating Agency.   The Moody’s Global Credit Research report dated December 11, 2013 stated that approximately $52 Billion in debt financing is affected by the downgrade review. During the review period, Moody’s reports the downgrade review will focus on the following:

  • The ability to access the debt market for more public finance;

UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico reported, as of December 11, 2013, another large decline in multiple proprietary closed-end bond funds managed by UBS Asset Managers. According to the Prospectus and Offering documents for the UBS proprietary closed end bond funds, UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico and its financial advisors characterized the bond fund investment objective as current income consistent with the preservation of capital.  For many years, UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico and its financial advisors recommended that Puerto Rican residents maintain concentrated positions in their family of proprietary closed-end bond funds.

To enhance the yield to investors, UBS Asset Managers had the ability to leverage the investments made in the bond mutual fund portfolios up to 50% of the value of the underlying portfolio.  The leverage resulted in catastrophic losses in the value of the portfolio concentrated in Puerto Rico issued securities sold exclusively to Puerto Rican residents for tax advantaged income.   UBS Asset Managers had an obligation and failed to properly manage the portfolio including effective hedging strategies to protect the fixed income portfolios concentrated in securities issued in Puerto Rico.

UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico reported the Net Asset Values for the following closed-end funds managed solely by UBS Asset Managers as of December 11, 2013:

UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico has received the attention of many market watchers in the media since their UBS Puerto Rico Family of Funds suffered a “meltdown” in value.  What did not receive adequate media attention are UBS’ sales practices which through the zeal of its financial advisors has left Puerto Rico residents holding excessive amounts of a failed financial product, and in many instances laden with UBS Bank loans.  We have learned firsthand the extent of the destruction experienced by Puerto Rican residents who have been targeted by UBS.

The UBS Puerto Rico Family of Funds, UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, were designed to be sold exclusively to residents of Puerto Rico according to their Offering documents.  The investment objective was tax free income consistent with preservation of capital.  A closer look at the fine print deep in the Offering document tells investors a more cautious tale.

The Prospectus and Offering documents for the proprietary closed-end funds artfully disclose some of the potential risks deemed required by regulatory laws.  The risks include:

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