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Of all the guarantees, bells and whistles associated with variable annuities, perhaps the biggest guarantee is the steep up-front commission the financial advisor can earn for selling the product.

According to a recent Reuters’ article, variable annuity sales in the U.S. totaled $142.8 billion last year, and brokers can earn 7 percent or more in commissions on the insurance products.  Based on simple arithmetic, the commissions earned on an annual basis exceeds a billion dollars.

However, investors may be damaged when these complex products are not properly explained, tax or liquidity factors are not considered, or the advisor engages in “twisting” of improper annuity switching.  “Twisting” happens when a broker encourages a client to trade in an older annuity to buy a different one, often at significant cost to the client and benefit to the broker.

LPL Financial, the self-proclaimed “nation’s largest independent broker-dealer” was recently fined $950,000 by securities regulator FINRA for allegedly failing to supervise its brokers that sold alternative investments.  In a letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (“AWC”), signed March 24, 2014, LPL Financial (“LPL”) settled FINRA’s charges that it failed to implement an adequate supervisory system for the sale of alternative investments.

FINRA’s complaint focuses on LPL’s failure to have a suitable system in place to identify and determine whether purchases of alternative investments, such as equipment leasing programs, real estate limited partnerships, hedge funds, and managed futures, caused its customers’ accounts to be unsuitably concentrated in these types of investments.  The allegations further state that LPL’s three-tiered supervisory system had deficiencies at each tier that allowed its customers to become overconcentrated in alternative investments from January 1, 2008 through July 1, 2012.

Alternative investments are complex, high-commission, investments frequently sold by investment banks as an alternative to investing in the stock market.  The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a press release in 2014 to remind financial advisors of the compliance requirements related to the recommendation of alternative investments to investors.  Despite this, few retail investors are advised that alternative investments can be illiquid, speculative, and rife with conflicts of interest.  Unfortunately for investors, the $950,000 fine will not be paid to the victims.  Instead, investors who have been damaged may pursue FINRA arbitration claims to recover damages.

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Investor Bulletin on fees and expenses reminds investors about the effect fees on investment accounts can have on a portfolio over the long run.  According to the SEC Investor Bulletin, “These fees may seem small, but over time they can have a major impact on your investment portfolio.”  The SEC’s Office of Investor Education illustrates the effects through the use of a graph.  In the hypothetical example, a $100,000 portfolio is assumed to grow 4% annually with annual fees of 0.25%, 0.50% and 1.00% that are deducted over a 20-year period.  The differences between the account values at the end of period show a $30,000 disparity in portfolio values between the portfolios with 1.00% and 0.25% in annual fees deducted from the respective portfolios.  This simplistic example should make investors wary about the fees they are paying, whether disclosed or not, these fees can greatly diminish any retirement nest egg.

The SEC Investor Bulletin urges investors to “get informed” by reviewing account statements, confirmations and investment prospectuses to become better informed.  The bulletin also provides helpful questions investors should ask their financial advisors before investing:

What are all the fees relating to this account?

According to recent SEC filings, the Endowment Master Fund LP, has offered investors an exit strategy from the hedge fund offering a new fund through a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) which will be used to liquidate the Fund.  The Endowment Master Fund, LP was marketed heavily by Wall Street firms, including Merrill Lynch.  The PPM describes the Offer as a like-kind exchange of investors’ pro-rata interest of the portfolio holdings into a new PMF Fund, LP.   According to the SEC filings, dated February 20, 2014, “the PMF Fund, LP and the Endowment Master Fund, LP will be managed differently, with the PMF Fund, LP managed for purposes of orderly liquidation.”

For investors, the Offer provides little certainty because investors must choose whether to liquidate now without knowing the true value of the Fund which will be determined at a later date.  `The Offer for the like-kind exchange expires March 19, 2014 which requires more than a leap of faith for investors in a hedge fund that has languished far behind the market returns.  Investors must make an investment decision without knowledge of the value exchanged and how much will be realized during the liquidation period.  According to the New York Times article, After Weak Returns, the Endowment Fund Limits Withdrawals, the hedge fund, “began to struggle in 2011, suffering losses of about 4.1 percent, after fees, compared with a gain of 2.5 percent by the S&P 500.”

 On February 24, 2014, a Thomson Reuters article underscores the effects of the substantial hedge fund costs on the Funds dismal performance, “Even for investors who stay with the fund, there will be high costs.  They will not be permitted to ask for any money back this year.  They will also be charged a 1 percent management fee and a 1 percent servicing fee.  On top of that there will be the fund’s underlying managers’ 1.3 percent management fee and a 16 percent of profits as an incentive fee.”  The article points to the hedge fund underperformance in 2013, “with the fund earning only 2.08 percent last year, dramatically trailing the Standard & Poor’s 32 percent gain.”  For Merrill Lynch customer’s, “If investors accessed the Endowment Fund through Merrill Lynch they will have paid as much as a 2.5 percent upfront charge.”

Be prepared, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) warns investors, “to ask your insurance agent, broker, financial planner, or other financial professional lots of questions about whether a variable annuity is right for you.“ Investor education is the key to making informed investment decisions, but what questions should be asked? Investors must rely on their advisors because the variable annuity prospectus, frequently 100-plus pages, or more, is convoluted and not easily understood by the Average investor. The SEC recently issued an Investor Tip: Variable Annuities, What You Should Know publication to provide direction for investors.

Variable annuity contracts are considered by many investors complex which leads to their reliance upon the financial advisor who recommends the investment. The terms of the contract which investors should be familiar include:

  • surrender period;

UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico has come under the scrutiny of a leading bond market commentator, The Bond Buyer in yesterday’s article titled, UBS Puerto Rico Faces Surge in Arbitration Claims.  Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch’s credit ratings agencies downgraded Puerto Rico’s general obligation bonds to junk bond status, which is below the investment grade status given to most U.S. municipal bonds.  The downgrade was predicted by UBS Financial Services’ (UBS) recent report Municipal Brief: Puerto Rico Credit & Market Update dated January 29, 2104.  This prediction came long after UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico branch offices mobilized its sales force with a targeted marketing campaign to sell the UBS Puerto Rico Family of Funds to investors.  A market revelation that is too late for those Puerto Rico investors’ whose portfolios are now heavily laden with UBS’ proprietary closed-end funds geographically concentrated in Puerto Rico bonds.

As mentioned in our previous blog post, “The removal of Puerto Rico municipal bonds from the universe of ‘investment grade’ municipal bonds could potentially result in increased sell orders from municipal bond portfolio managers driving prices lower.”  Further price declines in Puerto Rico municipal bonds has already occurred and the effects for many UBS closed-end funds, including UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, has been an average drop in many of the funds’ net asset values (NAV) of another 5% since the announced credit ratings downgrades.

Scott L. Silver, managing partner of Silver Law Group, has brought clarity to many Puerto Rico investors who have contacted his law firm.  These investors have a better understanding of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) securities arbitration process.  The bond buyer reported, “his firm has filed about three dozen claims for FINRA arbitration in the past several weeks.”  According to the Bond Buyer interview Mr. Silver pointed out that FINRA “rules require dealers to supervise the activities in customer accounts” and said “his clients’ losses may be attributed to a failure by UBS to supervise their financial advisors.”

The Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s credit ratings agencies downgraded Puerto Rico’s general obligation bonds to BB+ and Ba2, respectively, which is below the investment grade status given to most U.S. municipal bonds. The downgrade had been prognosticated by many brokerage firm research analysts, including UBS Financial Services (UBS) over the last several weeks. UBS Financial Services’ recent report Municipal Brief: Puerto Rico Credit & Market Update dated January 29, 2104, predicted downgrade and additional problems for Puerto Rico Municipal Bond Investors. The reported sentiments of UBS Wealth Management research analysts Thomas McLoughlin and Kristin Stephens are clear, “The probability of a downgrade of the Commonwealth’s GO and related bond ratings by all three ratings agencies into the non-investment grade category by the end of the fiscal year (30 June 2014) is high. Given the myriad obstacles facing Puerto Rico, we believe that at least one rating agency will take such an action within the next 30 days.” UBS research opinions were also consistent with recent moves by S&P Dow Jones Indices which oversees the methodology used for constructing the S&P National Municipal Bond Indices that are used by investors to track the performance of municipal bonds issued throughout the U.S.

On December 20, 2013, S&P Dow Jones Indices announced the removal of U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico, from the S&P Municipal Bond “investment grade indices.” According to S&P Dow Indices, the removal of Puerto Rico municipal bonds as a component from the U.S. National Municipal Bond Market indices was due to dissimilarities between the “performance and characteristics” between the U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico, and the universe of “investment grade” municipal bonds issued by states and municipalities throughout the country. These changes were originally to be made on a gradual basis through March 2014. On January 8, 2014, S&P Dow Jones Indices hastened the removal of U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico municipal bonds, from S&P National AMT-Free and S&P AMT-Free Municipal Series Indices which was now effective January 2014 month end.

The removal of Puerto Rico municipal bonds from the universe of “investment grade” municipal bonds could potentially result in increased sell orders from municipal bond portfolio managers driving prices lower. Selling pressure from municipal bond portfolios including large mutual funds that hold Puerto Rico municipal bonds could be required because of fund-imposed “investment grade” mandates or money manager negative sentiment about the Puerto Rican economy. UBS Puerto Rico Family of Funds, including UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, that are leveraged 50% against an underlying portfolio of Puerto Rico municipal bonds which may soon face lower prices. The effects of leverage on further price declines could be disastrous for closed-end funds that are illiquid and non-traded.

The Stifel Nicolaus & Company story about financial advisors’ lack of training and supervision concerning exchange traded funds (ETFs) is not much different than other Wall Street giants, including Morgan Stanley, UBS, Citigroup and Wells Fargo who were fined for similar violations.  On December 17, 2013 Stifel Nicolaus & Company agreed to a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent (AWC) with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and fined $1 million for violation of FINRA rules related to the sale of non-traditional ETFs to retail investors.  FINRA determined in the AWC violations related to a failure to supervise the unsuitable investment advice provided by its financial advisors to retail investors.

Non-traditional exchange traded funds are investments designed to achieve investment returns that are a multiple (leveraged) of an underlying benchmark or the inverse (negative correlation) to an underlying benchmark.  The leveraged or inverse ETFs are designed to track an underlying basket of securities, indexes, currencies or commodities.  In order to achieve these investment results derivatives, swaps and futures contracts must be used which makes non-traditional ETFs complex investments rarely understood by the financial advisors who recommend them.

Non-traditional ETFs use derivatives, swaps and futures contracts to accomplish the intended performance objectives and requires a daily reset of the portfolio holdings which results in a tracking error over time.  In other words, most non-traditional ETFs are only managed to meet the investment objectives on a daily basis.   Due to the tracking errors over time and the effects of leverage, the performance of an ETF can differ greatly from the performance of the underlying basket of securities, indexes, currencies or commodities.  According to a FINRA regulatory notice, “While the customer-specific suitability analysis depends on the investor’s particular circumstances, inverse and leveraged ETFs typically are not suitable for retail investors who plan to hold them for more than one trading session, particularly in volatile markets.”  For buy-and-hold investors, non-traditional exchange traded fund investments have experienced investment results much different from the projections made by their financial advisors.

UBS Financial Services of Puerto (UBS )recently reported the net asset values (NAV) for their proprietary closed-end funds mat suffer future losses.  These funds are a part of the UBS Puerto Rico Family of Funds which are marketed exclusively to Puerto Rico residents.  The UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, are leveraged 50% and concentrated in Puerto Rico issuers, continue to suffer losses with many Puerto Rico issuer credit ratings coming under review for potential downgrades.  As of January 2, 2014, UBS reported the UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds have declined on average another 7.15% and 4.16%, over the last 22 days.

According to UBS Financial Services,  Puerto Rico Municipal Bonds are currently under review for a downgrade in credit quality by Moody’s Rating Agency.   The Moody’s Global Credit Research report dated December 11, 2013 stated that approximately $52 Billion in debt financing is affected by the downgrade review. During the review period, Moody’s reports the downgrade review will focus on the following:

  • The ability to access the debt market for more public finance;

UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico reported, as of December 11, 2013, another large decline in multiple proprietary closed-end bond funds managed by UBS Asset Managers. According to the Prospectus and Offering documents for the UBS proprietary closed end bond funds, UBS Puerto Rico Fixed Income Funds and UBS Puerto Rico Investors Tax Free Funds, UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico and its financial advisors characterized the bond fund investment objective as current income consistent with the preservation of capital.  For many years, UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico and its financial advisors recommended that Puerto Rican residents maintain concentrated positions in their family of proprietary closed-end bond funds.

To enhance the yield to investors, UBS Asset Managers had the ability to leverage the investments made in the bond mutual fund portfolios up to 50% of the value of the underlying portfolio.  The leverage resulted in catastrophic losses in the value of the portfolio concentrated in Puerto Rico issued securities sold exclusively to Puerto Rican residents for tax advantaged income.   UBS Asset Managers had an obligation and failed to properly manage the portfolio including effective hedging strategies to protect the fixed income portfolios concentrated in securities issued in Puerto Rico.

UBS Financial Services of Puerto Rico reported the Net Asset Values for the following closed-end funds managed solely by UBS Asset Managers as of December 11, 2013:

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